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Abstract 
 
The paper assesses the performances of the urban local bodies in the state of Karnataka in India.We use non 
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis as a tool to measure technical efficiencies of the ULBs. If we compare 
the services in a particular size class of city with the norms we find that in the smallest size class it is water 
supply which has the minimum shortfall from norms, in the medium size cities it is road density which is 
closest to the norms and in the largest city size class it is the solid waste management which performs the best 
with zero shortfall from norms. On an average for all the services there is a shortage of 57 per cent of the ONM 
expenditure norms, the shortage being the highest (64 per cent) in the biggest size class of cities. If we 
compare across size classes we find that bigger cities have on an average higher proportions of ONM 
expenditures while both salary and establishment components show higher proportions in smaller cities. This 
is indicative to the fact that bigger cities are incurring more productive expenses than the smaller ones. We find 
that the overall average collection efficiency of property taxes is only 62 per cent which is the lowest in the 
smallest size class and the highest in the medium size class with little variation across cities. We find that only 
27.5 per cent of the ONM expenditure requirements can be fulfilled by the own revenues once the potential for 
the latter is fully realised. This proportion is higher in bigger cities with moderately high variation across 
cities. As far as the ONM cost coverage is concerned we find that on an average the ULBs in Karnataka can 
finance 50 per cent of the ONM costs on basic services through their own revenues with a very high variation 
in the proportions across cites. We find that the ULBs on an average can reduce 27 per cent of their 
expenditures on ONM, labor and establishment to provide the same levels of services provided currently by 
them. We also find that there can be additional savings particularly on establishment and labor expenditures to 
operate at the maximum efficiency levels. We find that the extent of problem of unproductive spending and 
under-provision of services is more pronounced in smaller cities. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Urbanisation is mostly a post globalization phenomenon in the developing 
countries. A change in many Asian countries was visible during the 1990s with a shift of 
focus in national policies that linked urbanization to economic growth. This came with a 
recognition that economic growth required links between national and global economies 
and that this could be achieved through urban development. Subsequently, many Asian 
countries have explicitly or implicitly promoted urbanisation.  
It is surprising that urbanization in Asia has been a much slower process than in 
most of the rest of the world. This is attributed to a set of factors pertaining to the 
problems of defining an area as purely urban in a transitional economy where the rural 
base dominates for ages. South Asia, in comparison with Asia’s other sub-regions, lags 
behind in the level of urbanization. In many South Asian countries, where urbanization 
levels are low compared with other sub-regions, natural increase has accounted for the 
bulk of urban growth in recent decades. However, in the South and South-West Asia, 
urban areas account for 33 per cent of the total population and 76 per cent of the sub-
region’s gross domestic product2. 
Seven of the ten most populous cities of the world are in Asia, including Tokyo, 
Delhi, Mumbai, Shanghai, Kolkata, Dhaka and Karachi. Many of these mega-cities have 
grown initially on urban-based manufacturing industries, and later on the services 
sector. Many mega-cities are also the seats of power, either political power as national 
capitals or as major economic or financial centres.   
60 per cent of Asia’s urban population lives in urban areas with populations 
under one million. Small and medium sized towns serve as local ‘economic growth 
centres’, i.e., markets for rural products and urban services.  All the categories, the 
bigger, medium and small cities, lack adequate infrastructure and services – unpaved 
roads, inadequate water supply and sanitation, untreated garbage, poor telephone and 
Internet connectivity, and erratic power supply being common in most south Asian 
cities, conditions being a bit better in bigger cities. But often bigger cities are more 
                                                 
2
 UN-ESCAP, UN HABITAT  2010.The State of Asian Cities 2010/11 
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constrained as far as financing the needs are concerned. The decentralization policies 
in these cities are encouraged to tackle these problems. 
Challenges for infrastructure policy and investment in South Asia are discussed 
widely in the policy literature. The context is one in which the major economies (led by 
China and more recently India) have enjoyed increasingly rapid growth accompanied by 
substantial reductions in poverty. Infrastructure investment has played an important part 
in this growth, but the increasing demands related to growth have also highlighted 
shortfalls in the quantity and quality of infrastructure and this is increasingly seen as a 
binding constraint on accelerating growth further, particularly in India (Rao and Bird, 
2010, 2011). 
Urban infrastructure services are heavily supply-constrained, as is well known, 
mainly owing to serious lack of resources available to finance them. Recent analysis by 
the Planning Commission of India shows that 34 per cent of urban households do not 
have water taps within their premises, 26 per cent of them do not have toilets, 70 per 
cent of waste is not treated before disposal, and untreated sewerage and unregulated 
discharge from industries is a major source of water pollution.  
Even the Zakaria Committee norms, formulated in 1963, are not satisfied in most 
of the Indian cities. Mohanty et al (2007) found that on an average for the period 1999-
2000 to 2003-04 actual spending in 30 large municipal corporations in India is only 
about 24 per cent of the requirements established by the Zakaria Committee. While 
there was considerable variability in the sample, the extent of ‘under spending’ on urban 
services was over 75 per cent in 17 municipal corporations, and indeed over 50 per cent 
in all of them except for three: Pune (31.6 per cent ), Nagpur (30.8 per cent), and Nasik 
(35.5 per cent). At the other extreme, spending in the Patna Municipal Corporation was 
estimated to be only 5.6 per cent of the normative requirement, and the shortfall was 
over 90 per cent in almost all municipal corporations in the poorest States of Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar.  
Ramanathan and Dasgupta (2009) estimates cumulative capital investment 
requirements for providing services at 2007 prices for the period 2006-2031 at Rs. 
71,251 billion and O&M requirements at Rs. 10,031 billion. This works out to an annual 
4 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
average of Rs. 3,251 billion or about 25 per cent of the consolidated revenue receipts of 
the Centre and States.  
Various ways of augmenting the resources of the municipal bodies in the country, 
including essential reforms in the property tax system and adequate exploitation of user 
charges and fees for various services delivered as well as ways of strengthening and 
improving central and state transfers to urban local governments, are explored in Rao 
and Bird (2010, 2011). With respect to financing urban infrastructure, judicious use of 
development charges and effective collections from public lands are recommended in 
general. In addition, development of the municipal bond market is also advocated for 
financing capital expenditures. 
A recent study on the urban local bodies in the state of Jharkhand 
(Bandyopadhyay 2011) based on Ramanathan and Dasgupta (2009) norms estimates 
that the actual revenue expenditures can cover only 41 per cent of the revenue 
expenditures requirements. Actual capital expenditures can cover 3 per cent of the 
capital expenditure requirements on urban services.   
Studies have attempted to provide empirical estimations of underutilization of 
revenue potentials. Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009) in their study on five major 
agglomerations in India viz. Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai, Pune and Hyderabad which 
constitutes 15 per cent of India’s total urban population finds that all the agglomerations 
have unutilized potential for revenue generation. The potential for the central cities of 
the agglomerations are estimated to be 79 per cent more than the actuals while the 
smaller ULBs in the agglomerations are estimated to have 25 per cent more. 
Bandyopadhyay (2011) estimates the total revenue potential for ULBs in the state of 
Jharkhand to be 77 per cent more than what is actually generated in the ULBs of the 
state. Another study (NIPFP 2009) based on 36 large municipal corporations all over 
India, each with a population of more than 1 million, accounting for 35 per cent of the 
urban population in the country shows that property tax potential can be estimated to 
constitute between 0.16 and 0.24 per cent of the country’s GDP. The study pointed out 
that there remains huge untapped revenues on account of property tax in the country 
and to improve the situation, states should focus on improving coverage and collection 
efficiency. Property tax revenues could increase to an extent of three times as high as 
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the present collections by bringing all cities to an 85 per cent coverage level from an 
average coverage ratio of 56 per cent and 85 per cent collection efficiency from an 
average collection efficiency of 37 per cent.  
Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009) also estimates the fiscal gaps for five major 
agglomerations in India. The main findings suggest that, except for five small urban 
local bodies in Hyderabad, the others are not in a position to cover their expenditure 
needs by their present revenue collections. All the agglomerations have unutilized 
potential for revenue generation; however, with the exception of Hyderabad, they would 
fail to cover their expenditure needs even if they realize their revenue potential. 
Excepting Chennai, larger corporations are more constrained than smaller urban local 
bodies.  
From the above discussion it is clear that while there have been some sporadic 
efforts on the estimation of revenue potential for Indian cities, their expenditure needs 
and fiscal gaps, extensive research needs to be undertaken focusing on service 
delivery, which is totally ignored as far as studies at the local levels are concerned. In 
this study we choose Karnataka which is one of the better performing states in India to 
have a detailed analysis. The main reason for choosing Karnataka is that the state is 
one of the pioneers in undertaking the Service Level Benchmarking exercise mandated 
by the Ministry of Urban Development of India as a special drive on tackling poor 
service delivery conditions in Indian cities. 
The main objective of the study is three fold. First, we review in detail the service 
delivery scenario in the cities of Karnataka, to estimate the shortfall in physical levels of 
services and their operations and maintenance (ONM) expenditures from the physical 
and financial norms respectively which are prescribed for Indian cities. Some 
estimations of ONM expenditure requirements are also attempted. Second, we analyse 
the sources of own revenues and the revenue expenditures in the cities and estimate 
the shortfall of resources to assess the extent of self reliance in the cities, that is to see 
how far the own revenues can cover the revenue expenditures. Some estimations of 
own revenue capacities are also attempted. Third, we attempt to judge the performance 
of the cities taking the service provisions as the outcomes with the resources used by 
6 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
them in an integrated framework and pinpoint some possible sources of mis-utilisation 
of resources.  
In what follows we would like to give a brief introduction to the urban sector in the 
state of Karnataka in section 2; section 3 spells out the main services and the related 
issues, Section 4 is on finances focusing on local revenues and revenue expenditures; 
section 5 would bring in the service delivery and the finances together to build up a 
model to assess the performance of the ULBs through their efficiency scores in different 
size classes, Section 6 gives the concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Cities in Karnataka  
 Indicators (median values) from the census data are derived for each category of 
ULBs (Table 1) in Karnataka. Municipal Services are the basic services such as Water 
supply, Roads, Street Lights, Sewerage and Sanitation, and solid waste management, 
the responsibility of which is given to the local governments in terms of Provision and 
Operation and Maintenance. Apart from solid waste management the coverage 
indicators for other services are available in the census. 
 Other than these coverage indicators, some indicators available from the census 
are also analysed which has some impact on the fiscal handles of the ULBs. These 
indicators are grouped according to their roles in determining the expenditures on the 
ULBs for service provision. However, there are possible overlaps across categories and 
each group can influence the other. 
  Cost indicators (Population, Population Density, Area, Number of Households 
and Household Size) determine the expenditure that local governments incur on 
account of provision of basic services. These indicators determine the cost of service 
provision by reflecting the extent of economies of scale in the city.  
Demand Indicators such as Literacy Rate, Percentage of Households Availing 
Banking Facilities and Percentage of households having none of the specified assets3.  
                                                 
3
 Census of India specifies radio, transistor, telephone, television, bi-cycle, scooter, moto-cycle, moped, car, jeep 
and van as the set of assets.  
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Table 1: Some Indicators (Median) in the ULBs of Karnataka: Socio-demographic, Demand, Services, 
Infrastructure and Employment 
Source: Census of India, 2001; CB: cantonment Boards, CMC: City Municipal councils;CT: Census Towns, MCorp: Municipal corporation,  
NAC:notified area committee; TMC: Town Municipal corporations, TP: Town Panchayat
Categories Indicators CB CMC CT M CORP NAC TMC TP 
  
S
o
c
io
-D
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
 
/ 
C
o
s
t 
  
no. of ULB 1 40 44 6 8 80 89 
Population (No) 23779 113509.5 7823.5 588974 8297.5 32990 17923 
Number of Households 4150 22851 1621.5 116365.5 1886.5 6348 3318 
Household Size 5.7 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.2 
Area(sq km) 7.2 34.41 4.455 149.355 6.6 11.18 5.55 
Density (Persons per sq km) 3302.6 3707.4 1943.4 5178.3 1546.3 3369.3 3524.8 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
 
Households availing Banking Facilities (per cent) - 41 - 53 - - - 
Households having none of the specified assets (per cent) - 19 - 15.0 - - - 
Literacy (per cent) 77.85 70.58 72.10 75.72 73.90 66.07 64.52 
S
e
rv
ic
e
s
 
 
Road Length per 1000 Population( in km) - 1.06411 - 1.20994 2.33299 1.15875 1.11170 
Street lights per 1000 population (Nos) 33 31 29 32 44 29 27 
Households having Closed Drainage (per cent) 39.1 24.7 7.9 52.9 66.6 9.2 6.7 
Households having Tap as source of drinking water (per cent) 60 81.6 56.9 78.5 96.8 78.9 80.5 
In
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
 
 
Domestic and Non Domestic Connections per 1000 Population 186.97 227.10 326.41 255.18 195.64 198.30 187.18 
Non Domestic Connections to Total Connections(per cent) 15.05 18.49 21.25 23.32 4.76 20.66 18.67 
Banks (Nos) 5 17 2 89 1 5 4.5 
Banks per sq km 0.69 0.49 0.45 0.60 0.15 0.45 0.81 
Electricity Available per 1000  population  110.8 186.5 184.8 195.7 195.7 156.5 161.1 
Toilet Facilities Available to population per 1000 950.6 945.8 961.3 970.4 949.2 924.7 910.3 
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
 
Main Other workers in working population(per cent) 90.57 82.20 84.18 86.30 90.97 69.65 62.17 
Main non-agricultural  workers in Working Population (per cent) 99.85 98.33 98.77 99.43 99.53 94.82 91.71 
Main Other workers as a percentage of main workers  99.23 89.93 93.17 93.24 98.47 77.65 72.94 
Main non- agricultural  Workers to Total Main Workers (per cent) 99.84 98.16 98.64 99.39 99.50 94.40 90.52 
Total Main Workers to Total Population (per cent) 36.99 32.01 36.81 30.78 25.57 31.68 32.11 
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are indicative of the income levels of the people residing in the jurisdiction of the local 
bodies, which are among the factors determining the preferences of inhabitants of a city 
and thus influence demand for Municipal services  
 Infrastructure indicators, namely Toilet facilities, Electricity connections (apart 
from those provided by local government in street lights), Banks per sq km etc. These 
indicators give an idea about the infrastructure in a city which is provided in 
collaboration with the state government agencies or private public partnership.   
     Touching on the Employment indicators the composition of total working 
population and main working population are analysed. Emphasis is given on the 
categories like other workers and non agricultural workers which are most relevant as 
occupations of the urban population. For each category of cities the median value of a 
variable is considered. For the main analysis we divide the urban local bodies (ULBs) of 
Karnataka into three size classes for convenience and record the summary statistics 
related to population, population growth rates and area through Figures 1 and 2  below. 
 
 
Figure 1 Population Statistics in Different Size Classes of Karnataka ULBs 
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Figure 2 Growth Rates of Population and Area in Different Size classes of 
Karnataka  ULBs 
 
  
 We find that the average decadal growth rate of population is around 19 per cent 
which is lower in the smallest size class of below 25,000 population but more or less the 
same in the other two size classes which is around 20 per cent. The annual exponential 
growth rate of population on an average is around 2.2 per cent which is higher in the 
two size classes above 25,000 population, with not much variation across the cities. 
Some of the ULBs have contracted in area which is reflected in the falling averages for 
2009-10 figures for area (Figure 2). 
 
2 Service Delivery 
  
This section gives a detailed account of the issues related to service delivery in the 
ULBs of Karnataka. We start with the functions assigned to the ULBs of Karnataka, give 
an outline of the service level benchmarking, discuss the latest physical and financial 
norms on urban services in India4, estimate the service wise shortfalls from physical and 
financial norms and derive the expenditure requirement estimates of the ULBs on basic 
services. For actual expenditures and service levels provided we use the data for the 
year 2009-10 collected from the individual ULBs by the Directorate of Municipal 
                                                 
4
 The state does not have separate norms. 
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Administration (DMA) of Karnataka followed by subsequent enquiries. We consider 213 
ULBs of Karnataka excluding the Cantonment Boards, Census Towns and Notified Area 
committees for our analysis. 
 
Eighteen functions are transferred to the urban local governments vide 74th 
constitutional amendment in India. The core functions include: 
• Roads and bridges  
• Water supply  
• Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management  
• Burials and burial grounds, cremation grounds and electric crematoriums  
• Public  amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public 
conveniences  
The welfare functions include: 
• Safeguarding the interests of the weaker sections of society  
• Slum improvement and upgradation  
• Urban poverty alleviation  
• Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens and 
playgrounds  
• Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects  
• Cattle pounds and prevention of cruelty to animals  
The development functions include 
 
• Urban planning, including town planning 
• Regulation of land use and construction of buildings 
• Planning  for economic and social development 
• Fire services 
• Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological 
aspects 
• Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths 
• Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries 
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We would mainly consider five major services viz. water supply, 
sewerage/sanitation, roads, street lighting and solid waste management for our 
analysis. 
 
Service Level Benchmarking 
 
As part of the ongoing endeavour to facilitate critical reforms in the urban sector, the 
Ministry of Urban Development has now adopted National Benchmarks in four key 
sectors—Water Supply, Sewerage, Solid Waste Management and Storm Water 
Drainage. Investments in urban infrastructure have, however, not always resulted in 
corresponding improvements in levels of service delivery. There is, therefore, a need for 
a shift in focus towards service delivery. This is especially the case in water supply and 
sanitation. A Handbook of Service Delivery Benchmarking has been developed by the 
Ministry of Urban Development through a consultative process to provide a 
standardised framework for performance monitoring in respect to water supply, 
sewerage, solid waste management services and storm water drainage, and would 
enable State level agencies and local level service providers to initiate a process of 
performance monitoring and evaluation against agreed targets, finally resulting in the 
achievement of service level benchmarks identified. The Ministry of Urban Development 
would facilitate the adoption of these benchmarks through its various schemes and 
would also provide appropriate support to municipalities that move towards the adoption 
of these benchmarks.  
Benchmarking is a management technique that organizations use for regular 
monitoring and reporting of various programs, departments or work units. It is 
concerned with not only how much is being done, but also how efficiently, of what 
quality and to what effect. It also serves as a tool for strategic decision making and long 
term planning. 
In the context of urban local bodies, benchmarking can be defined as the process of 
determining how efficiently and effectively the concerned agencies are delivering the 
services and the effort of the agencies in improving the mobilization of own resources 
and to measure whether this resources are being utilized in an optimum manner or not. 
12 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
It also provides an assessment of the quality of work the local body is doing and how 
successful it has been in satisfying community needs and expectations. 
Service Level Benchmarking (SLB) application provides ULBs with a tool for 
monitoring the inputs and outputs associated with each service, evaluating their 
performance level and taking corrective actions to improve their performance and hence 
the service. It also helps ULBs in identifying resources and how to improve the same.  
SLB Methodology 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Urban Development, India 
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Norms in Services for Indian Cities 
 
The idea of benchmarking can be coupled with the norms and standards of urban 
services developed for Indian cities based on engineering calculations and city level 
characteristics. The literature on norms on service delivery for Indian cities dates back 
to Zakaria(1963) which estimates the norms and standards for the essential services in 
different size classes of cities. Subsequently Report of Working group III (1995), 
Pricewaterhousecoopers 2001, NIUA (2007) and many other state level estimates were 
generated updating Zakaria (1963) norms adjusting for current price levels. But with 
time the change in lifestyle has an enormous impact which has altered the definition of 
standards for municipal services which made the norms designed in 1963 somewhat 
inappropriate. 
The High Powered Expert Committee in 2011 (HPEC 2011) has estimated the 
Physical and Financial (per capita investment costs and Operation and Maintenance 
Costs) of Urban services over the 20 year period from 2012 to 2031 (at 2009-10 prices). 
The estimation is done separately for 6 class sizes of population, which are classified as 
following (Table 2): 
 
Table 2: Classification of Cities by Population 
 
Size Class Population 
IA >5 Million 
IB 1-5 Million 
IC 100,000-1 Million 
II 50,000-100,000 
III 20,000-50,000 
IV+ <20,000 
              Source: HPEC, 2011 
The population is projected for a sample of cities till 2031 using the population data 
taken from Census and the size class-wise UN population growth rates. It is to be noted 
that the lowest class provided by UN is below 50,000. Therefore, growth rate of this 
class is used for the classes II to IV+.UN estimates are only available up to the year 
2030. Population figures for 2031 are projected assuming the same annual growth 
applied to the period 2025-30. 
The service standard benchmarks (physical norms) used are prepared by Ministry of 
Urban Development. For the services of water supply, sewerage, and solid waste 
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management, service standards (24x7 water supply, underground sewerage systems 
with complete coverage, 100 per cent collection, treatment, and disposal of solid waste 
for all cities) as specified by the Ministry are the same for all city size classes.  
For the sectors like storm water drains, street lighting and roads the Committee felt 
the need for differential standards, as these sectors’ needs depend on city size  Sector-
specific experts were consulted to make some adjustments in service standards 
prepared by the Ministry of Urban Development to accommodate these needs. Table 3 
presents the details of the service standards for each of the eight sectors. The financial 
requirements have been estimated using these services norms 
 
Table 3: Physical Norms 
 
Service Physical Norms 
Water Supply 100 per cent individual piped water supply for all households 
including 
informal settlements for all cities 
• Continuity of supply: 24x7 water supply for all cities 
• Per capita consumption norm:135 litres per  capita per day 
for all cities 
Sewerage  
 
Underground sewerage system for all cities and 100 per cent 
collection and treatment of waste water 
Solid Waste 100 per cent of solid waste collected, transported, and treated 
for all cities as per Municipal Solid Waste 2000 Rules 
Storm Water Drains Drain network covering 100 per cent road length on both sides 
of the road for all cities 
Street Lighting Illuminance: 35 Lux (35 lumens per sq. km) for all road 
categories in all cities 
• Spacing between street lights: 40 m for major roads, 45 m for 
collector roads, and 50 m for access road spaces 
Urban Roads Size class Road  Density (km per sq km) 
IA 12.25 
IB 12.25 
IC 12.25 
II-IV+ 7 
Source: HPEC, 2011 
Per Capita Investment Costs (PCIC): 
To estimate the PCIC of Water Supply, Sewerage and Solid Waste Management 
the approved projects under the Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) and Urban 
Infrastructure Development Schemes for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) 
Schemes of the JNNURM during the period 2006 to 2009, together with projects funded 
by the World Bank were studied. Each sector has been divided in sub sectors. For 
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example, in case of water total PCIC consists of production and distribution costs. 
Similarly for Solid waste management, costs calculated separately for collection, 
transportation, processing and disposal have been clubbed to arrive at total PCIC for 
each class size. 
The methodology adopted for Roads, Street Lighting and Storm water drains was 
different. For these services, unit costs for each class size are taken from the project 
data. These unit costs for each service are multiplied with the volume/production of 
service in their respective class sizes. For example in case of roads, cost per sq km is 
multiplied with total road length. This is then divided by population density of respective 
class sizes to estimate the PCIC of that service. The PCIC are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: PCIC norms (INR, per capita) 
 
Size Class Water 
Supply 
Sewerage Solid Waste 
Management 
Urban 
Roads 
Storm Water 
Drains 
Street 
Lighting 
1A 3517 3360 900 23460 4140 2491 
1B 4395 3841 393 23460 4140 1606 
1C 5924 3411 410 29325 5175 1258 
II 4957 5316 236 16800 2100 207 
III 5901 5649 204 22400 2800 107 
IV+  5901 6648 204 22400 2800 107 
Source: HPEC, 2011 
 
Per capita Operation and Maintenance (PCOM) Costs: 
The O&M cost considered for the estimation exercise includes the cost of O&M 
of physical assets and material costs for the respective sectors. The O&M computation 
takes into account both the cost of O&M of existing assets as well as of new assets that 
will be created over the 20-year period. 
In water supply, sewerage, and solid waste management, per capita operations 
and maintenance costs (PCOM) are computed using (i) unit cost from project data, (ii) 
estimates of production volume for each sector, and (iii) the population covered. For the 
remaining sectors, the PCOM is assumed to be a percentage of the PCIC.( For street 
Lighting it is assumed to be 2.2 per cent of PCIC, for storm water it is 1.5 per cent of 
PCIC and it is assumed to be 2 per cent of the PCIC for all roads covering both existing 
and new assets. The O&M norms are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: PCOM Norms (INR, per capita) 
 
Size Class Water 
Supply 
Sewerage Solid Waste 
Management 
Urban 
Roads 
Strom Water 
Drains 
Street 
Lighting 
1A 797 414 269 421 62 90 
1B 613 373 189 421 62 55 
1C 491 290 135 527 78 54 
II 491 290 113 276 32  4 
Class III III 368 207 113 368 
Class IV+ 
42 3 
IV+  245 145 113 368 
Class IV+ 
42 3 
    Source: HPEC, 2011 
 
Physical Levels of Services and Expenditure Requirements: Some Estimations 
 
This section deals with some estimations related to service delivery in the ULBs 
of Karnataka. First, we would analyse two basic summary statistics of the actual levels 
of services provided and the shortfalls from the norms of these services. We consider 
the median for the average levels and the coefficient of variation (CV) as a measure of 
‘spread’ within a size class. For water supply, we consider the per capita levels of water 
supply, number of days of water supply in a week and number of hours of water supply 
in a day. For solid waste management we consider collection and transportation 
efficiencies, which respectively can be defined as the percentage of garbage collected 
of total amount of garbage generated and the percentage of garbage transported of 
total garbage collected. For roads we take the urban road density as the indicator for 
analysis which is defined as the road length per square feet area of the ULB.  
Second, we analyse some basic summary statistics for the actual expenditures 
on these basic services and the shortfalls from O&M norms for each service and also 
for all the services together. The expenditure requirements, taken together for all the 
services for one ULB, would give a simple measure of expenditure needs on service 
provision for that ULB. The norms from HPEC (2011) are taken for comparisons.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 It is to be noted that the analysis is subject to some data constraints. We cannot verify the street lighting physical 
norms as the data on distance between two poles for the ULBs are not available. For financial norms we only 
confine ourselves to O&M norms as the capital expenditure data as annual expenditures are nt recorded as they are 
lumpy in nature and are incurred generally on specific project related outlays.  
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Table 6 Summary: Physical Levels of Services 
 
Size Class 
  
Below 25000 25000 to 50000 Above 50000 All 
Median CV Median CV Median CV Median CV 
Water 
Supply 
per capita supply 
(LPCD) 
102 1.3 74.6 0.7 96 0.6 90 1.1 
Norms Coverage (%) 76  1.2  56  0.6  72  0.6  69  1.1  
Days of Supply in a 
Week 
3 0.5 3 0.5 3 0.5 3 0.5 
Hours of Supply in a 
Day 
1 0.8 1 1.2 1 1.4 1 1.1 
Solid Waste 
Management 
Collection efficiency 75 0.2 88 0.04 100 0.1 85 0.2 
Transportation 
Efficiency 
71.4 0.2 88 0.06 100 0.8 83 0.5 
Urban 
Roads 
Road Density (KM per 
Sq KM Area) 
5 1.13 6.3 1.1 9 2.2 6 2.5 
Norms Coverage (%)  71.6  1.1  90  1.1  84  2.6  82  2.6 
 
Table 6 above summarises the physical levels of services and their 
coverages/shortfalls in terms of the respective norms in different size classes of cities 
and the state as a whole. We find that  there is no pattern across the size classes as far 
as physical levels of water supply is concerned, the median for the state as a whole 
being 90 litres per capita per day and the highest being recorded in the smallest size 
class at 102 lpcd. A look at the CVs imply that for the smallest class the distribution of 
the average is the most scattered implying that there is a wide range of per capita levels 
of water supply in this size class. This supply covers 69 per cent of the norms 
prescribed. On an average Karnataka ULBs get water supply for three days a week, 
which is uniform across size classes. On an average each day has a one hour supply of 
water which is also uniform across size classes but variations differ in each size class a 
little and the CV increases with size class, the highest variation being recorded in the 
largest city size class. If compared with 24x7 water supply norm, the indicators are not 
too encouraging.  
For solid waste management, both the collection and the transportation 
efficiencies increase with size class of cities, the median being recorded at 85 and 83 
per cent for the entire state respectively. The variation in each size class is minimal as 
far as these indicators are concerned. The norm being 100 per cent we can infer that 
the solid waste management indicators are closer to the norm than those of water 
supply. 
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As far as road density is concerned the bigger cities are closer to the norms but  
higher variations in bigger size classes are also noticed. On an average for the state 82 
per cent of the norms are being covered for this indicator. 
If we compare the services in a particular size class of city we find that in the 
smallest size class it is water supply which has the minimum shortfall from norms, in the 
medium size cities it is road density which is closest to the norms and in the largest city 
size class it is the solid waste management which performs the best with zero shortfall 
from norms. 
 
 Table 7 Summary: Expenditures on Services 
 
Services Indicators Below 25,000 25,000 to 50,000 Above 50,000 All 
Median CV Median CV Median CV Median CV 
Water 
Supply 
ONM cost per Capita 
(INR) 168 1.3 213 0.6 228 2 203 1.5 
Coverage of Norms (%) 55 1.2 58 0.6 46 2 53 1.3 
Solid Waste 
Management 
ONM cost per 
Capita(INR) 8.5 2.7 14.2 1.5 14.5 1.5 11 3.5 
Coverage of Norms(%) 7.5 2.7 13 1.5 12 1.4 9.3 3.2 
Urban 
Roads 
ONM cost per 
Capita(INR) 35.60 1.7 36.10 1.6 20 1.5 33 1.7 
Coverage of Norms(%) 71.6 1.1 90 1.1 84 2.6 82 2.6 
Street 
Lighting 
ONM cost per 
Capita(INR) 43.4 1 37 1.5 39 0.8 42 1.2 
Coverage of Norms(%) 1447 1 1238 1.5 211 1.5 1151 1.4 
All Services ONM cost per 
Capita(INR) 364 1 390 1 352 1.4 372 1 
Coverage of Norms (%) 45 1 46 1 36 1.2 43 1 
 
Table 7 above summarises the operations and maintenance (ONM) expenditures 
and their shortages from financial norms on all of the basic urban services in the ULBs 
of Karnataka. We find that in water supply the ONM expenditures actually incurred 
cannot cover the norms prescribed for the same in all the size classes. On an average 
there is a shortage of 47 per cent for cities in the state as a whole, the highest per 
capita expenditure being incurred in the biggest size class with the highest shortfall from 
norms at 54 per cent. The variation within a size class is high in the biggest size class of 
cities. For solid waste management only 9.3 per cent of the norms prescribed for ONM 
expenditures are being covered with a very high variation across cities. For urban roads 
82 per cent of the expenditure norms on ONM are being covered with a high variation 
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across cities. The case for street lighting is different as we find that the expenditures 
incurred are 1051 per cent more than that prescribed by norms. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the state is changing over to the low energy intensive bulbs for street 
lighting. As the ONM includes the cost of bulbs we get such unusually high figures for 
expenditures in this transition period as the low energy bulbs cost on an average 20 
times more than the usual ones and the norms do not include additional the costs of 
changing over. On an average for all the services there is a shortage of 57 per cent of 
the ONM expenditure norms, the shortage being the highest (64 per cent) in the biggest 
size class of cities. 
 
4. Finances 
After analysing the issues related to service delivery, we look at the financial 
indicators of the ULBs in Karnataka. We touch upon the main expenditure heads and 
major sources of revenues in the ULBs of Karnataka.  We analyse the composition of 
revenue expenditures and own revenues of the ULBs. The idea is to find out whether 
the low expenditure levels on service provision is due to lower levels of revenue 
collections. We also attempt to estimate the own revenue capacities of the ULBs. 
 The major tax sources comprise of the tax on Land and buildings, advertisement, toll 
on vehicles, additional stamp duty, water tax; non tax collections are mainly from user 
charges on services, rental income from municipal properties, fees and fines, 
developmental charges, License fee (building, trade, hotel), building betterment fee, 
birth and death registration fee, food and adulteration fee, slaughter house fee, 
compounding fee, etc.  
It is to be noted that we confine our analysis to the own revenue heads and revenue 
expenditures. The main focus would be to judge the self reliance of the ULBs for which 
one of the indicators which is important is the coverage of revenue expenditures from 
the own revenue sources. It has been the mandate of various urban reform agendas in 
India to enable the ULBs to cover the revenue expenditures from their own source 
revenues. We analyse the facts with the help of two sets of charts below where we have 
recorded the average value of each component in the composition of revenue 
expenditures and own revenues in percentages. 
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  Figure 3 below shows the composition of revenue expenditures in various size 
classes of cities and for the state of Karnataka as a whole. The major components of 
revenue expenditures are operations and maintenance expenditures for service  
  
Figure 3 :Composition of Revenue Expenditures 
 
 
 
provision, the salaries of different categories of regular employees including the 
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establishment of the ULB. A productive and useful way of allocating the resources 
would be to have a greater share of operations and maintenance than any other 
component.  
We find that the ONM component is higher than the other two components in all the 
size classes and thus in the state as a whole, followed by the salary and the 
establishment components. If we compare across size classes we find that bigger cities 
have on an average higher proportions of ONM expenditures while both salary and 
establishment components show higher proportions in smaller cities. This is indicative to 
the fact that bigger cities are incurring more productive expenses than the smaller ones.  
 
Figure 4: Composition of Own Revenues 
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Figure 4 above gives an idea about the composition of own revenues. We find that 
for the cities of Karnataka as a whole tax and non tax components are on an average 
more or less equal with non tax with a slightly higher proportion. For non tax and other 
tax components it is difficult to find a pattern across size classes of cities. Property 
taxes show the highest proportion in the smallest size class and the lowest in the 
biggest size class. 
 We also attempt a quick evaluation of the performance of the ULBs of Karnataka on 
the basis of some simple indicators. One way to assess is to see whether the own 
revenues can cover the revenue expenditures, if not, what is the percentage of 
shortfall? Then we can ask whether the own revenues are sufficient to cover the ONM 
costs of basic services provided by the ULBs. Table 8 below summarises the findings. 
 
Table 8 Some Financial Performance Indicators 
 Indicators Below 25000 25000 to 50000 Above 50000 All 
Median CV Median CV Median CV Median CV 
1 Own Revenue to 
Revenue 
Expenditure Ratio 
(%) 
13 0.5 31 0.21 112 3 27 5.3 
2 Own Revenue to 
ONM Expenditure 
ratio (%) 
24 1.4 52 0.65 200 2.5 50 4.4 
3 Water Charges to 
ONM Expenditure on 
Water (%) 
15 0.8 11 0.7 12 0.9 13 0.8 
4 Collection Efficiency  
of Property Taxes 
(%) 
53 0.6 65 0.4 58 0.6 62 0.5 
5 Own Revenue 
Capacity to Actual 
Own Revenue 
(Index) 
116 2.6 116 0.2 141 2.6 116 3 
6 Own Revenue 
Capacity to ONM 
Requirements 
23.5 2 27.5 2 27.5 2.2 27 2.2 
 
We find that on an average only 27 per cent of the revenue expenditures can be 
covered by own revenues in the ULBs of Karnataka with a high degree of variation (CV 
= 5.3). Only the own revenues of the biggest size class can cover fully the revenue 
expenditures and has a surplus of 12 per cent, but with a high variation in the size class. 
The smaller two size classes can cover a small proportion with hardly any variation 
within the size class (Row1, Table 8). 
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As far as the ONM cost coverage is concerned we find that on an average the 
ULBs in Karnataka can finance 50 per cent of the ONM costs on basic services through 
their own revenues with a very high variation in the proportions across cites. Only the 
biggest size class of cities have a surplus over the ONM costs (Row2, Table 8).  
We also attempt to see whether water charges collection can cover the ONM 
expenditures on water. We find that only 13 per cent of the ONM expenditures on water 
can be covered by water charges, which is more or less uniform across size classes 
with very little variation in each size class and also across size classes. (Row 3, Table 
8). 
  We have also analysed the performances of the ULBs in Karnataka from the 
collection efficiency ratios of property taxes which can be an important indicator of 
performance evaluation of the units. Collection efficiency ratio is defined as the ratio of 
the amount of tax actually collected to the amount demanded. The tax demanded and 
collected can be for the current and arrears which are recorded separately. Here we 
consider the total of current and arrears for the collection efficiency ratios calculations. 
We find that the overall average collection efficiency is only 62 per cent which is the 
lowest in the smallest size class and the highest in the medium size class with little 
variation across cities (Row 4, Table 8). 
 We have also attempted an estimation of own revenue capacities. In the absence of 
data on incomes of the cities we have taken the collection efficiency ratios as the 
reference for the estimations. We take 100 per cent collection efficiency in arrears 
collection and 90 per cent collection efficiency in current collections of property taxes 
which has been the basis for many reforms agenda on Indian cities. We find that on an 
average own revenues can increase by 16 per cent if the arrears collection is fully 
appropriated and current collection is at least 90 per cent of the current demand for 
property taxes, the non tax and other taxes being the same as before. The highest 
increase of 41 per cent is recorded in the biggest size class (Row 5, Table 8). 
 Having estimated the own revenue potentials we would like to know how much of the 
expenditure requirements on ONM can be covered once this potential is realized. We 
find that only 27.5 per cent of the ONM expenditure requirements can be fulfilled by the 
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own revenues once the potential for the latter is fully realised. This proportion is higher 
in bigger cities with moderately high variation across cities (Row 6, Table 8).  
 
5. Performance Evaluation of ULBs in Karnataka: A Benchmarking Framework 
 In this section we would like to develop a model in a benchmarking framework based 
on the principles of economic optimisation. The objective would be to assess the 
performance of the ULBs in Karnataka in an economically viable manner. The service 
level benchmarking framework provided by the Ministry of Urban Development is an 
effort to monitor the service delivery mechanism. Our effort would be to attempt an in-
depth analysis of performance taking the ULBs as the decision making unit (DMU) by 
bringing in the expenditures on various accounts as inputs and provision of services as 
outputs. This analysis attempts to bring together the financial parameters and the 
service delivery of the ULBs in the spirits of Eeckaut et al (1993), Borger et al (1994), 
Grossman et al (1999) which analyses the efficiencies of municipalities in different 
countries or explain the factors affecting these efficiencies.  The main objective of our 
analysis is to assess the performance of the ULBs in service delivery and resource 
utilization in an integrated manner. We also pinpoint the possible sources of cost 
savings by identifying the sources for mis-utilisation of resources.  
The benchmarking exercise is based on the theory of production. Production is 
an act of transforming inputs into outputs. Outputs are in general desirable outcomes. 
Hence, more output is better. At the same time inputs are valuable resources with 
alternative uses. The objective of a decision making unit (DMU) is either to produce as 
much output as possible from a specific quantity of inputs or to produce specific quantity 
of output using as little input as possible. An input output combination is a feasible 
production plan if, given the state of technological knowledge, the output quantity can 
be produced from the associated input quantity or vice versa.  
The performance of any DMU can be evaluated in terms of relative productivity 
or the efficiency of the unit concerned. Productivity is a descriptive measure of 
performance without any reference to the optimal achievable target whereas efficiency 
is a normative measure assessed with reference to the production frontier.  
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Efficiency by its simplest definition of the output version refers to the ability of a 
DMU to produce the maximum levels of outputs with a set of inputs. With a change in 
prices of inputs or a shift in technology or otherwise there can result a change in the 
input mix used by the DMU which in turn affects efficiency. When we refer to the DMU’s 
ability to produce as much as it can without taking any possible impact of input-prices, it 
is called productive or technical efficiency (TE), whereas when the effect of prices of 
inputs is taken into consideration while measuring efficiency it is termed as price or 
allocative efficiency.  
We would derive the technical efficiency scores of the ULBs as a measure of 
performance. This measure of efficiency is particularly useful in the absence of market 
prices for inputs or outputs as in the cases of problems in public economics and public 
policies. So, one of the advantages of this tool is that it can be applied to any economic 
activity in any sector even with constraints in availability of data on market prices. The 
application of efficiency analysis in public service delivery is particularly useful because 
of this advantage.  
Technical efficiency is an index which is expressed as the ratio of actual 
production and the potential productive capacity of a DMU using the same amount of 
resources. There are various ways to measure the technical efficiency. Once the 
decision making unit in a sector performs an economic activity transforming a set of 
inputs to a set of outputs and a frontier of production can be conceived of considering all 
the decision making units in the sector, we can apply the concept of technical efficiency 
to assess the performance of the units. While the basic principle of measurement of 
technical efficiency is the distance of the point of operation of a decision making unit 
from that projected on the frontier, two factors viz. the way the frontier is constructed 
and the way the distance is measured, make one method of estimation different from 
the other.  
The parametric approach requires the imposition of a specific functional form for 
a production frontier and some assumptions like independently and identically normally 
distributed errors which have to be uncorrelated with the independent variables. In 
contrast the non parametric approach does not require any functional form. It is based 
on a set of behavioral assumptions regarding production. Taking information from data 
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on inputs and outputs the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method generates a 
discrete piecewise frontier by optimizing on each individual observation given the set of 
Pareto efficient DMUs or the peers. The technical efficiency scores are derived as the 
ratio of the actual output to the ideal output specified by the generated frontier.   
For each family of parametric or non parametric specifications, the estimation 
can be done through mathematical optimization or econometric techniques. The 
distance between the point on which a decision making unit actually operates and the 
point on the frontier on which it should have operated can be measured as a radial or a 
non radial characterization. In this discussion we would mostly like to base our analysis 
on radial measures, We would consider the nonparametric method of DEA which uses a 
linear programming principle for assessing technical efficiency and is deterministic in 
nature.  
 
Nonparametric Optimisation Approach: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 DEA is based on mathematical programming. In the early fifties Koopmans and 
Debreu independently conceive of the notion of technical efficiency in an optimization 
framework in two different but related contexts. Koopmans (1951) defines a point in the 
commodity space as efficient whenever an increase in the net output for one commodity 
requires a decrease in that of the other. Debreu (1951), from the perspective of cost of 
resources, introduces the concept of coefficient of resource utilization as a measure of 
TE for the economy as a whole and interprets any deviation of this measure from unity 
as a deadweight loss for the society on account of inefficient utilization of resources.  
A few years later Farrell (1957) observes that the efficiency of a DMU which can 
reflect the ability to achieve the maximum level of output attainable by the state of 
technology or to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices, can 
be analysed in a diagrammatic framework of radial contraction of inputs/expansion of 
outputs from an observed point to the frontier. The main contribution of  Farrell in his 
seminal work is to provide a simple but structured intuition to derive efficiency at the 
DMU level using the principles of programming in a diagrammatic framework with 
iterative search for peer groups and a piecewise discrete frontier. An assumption of 
constant returns to scale (CRS) technology in production is made. Hoffman (1957) 
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suggests that the dual simplex method, an algorithm to solve a linear programming (LP) 
problem, can be applied to obtain Farrell’s measure of efficiency.  Farrell in his later 
work with Fieldhouse (Farrell and Fieldhouse 1962) attempts to solve the problem using 
the dual simplex algorithm where the case of increasing returns to scale is also 
considered. But the problem is that the objective function is a fractional one and thus 
the tools of LP are not sufficient to provide a satisfactory solution.  
 Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR 1978) contributes to convert the fractional 
programming into a linear programming by selecting suitable weights which are nothing 
but the virtual prices of inputs and outputs. In their subsequent work in 1979 and 1981 a 
generalized DEA in a multiple-output multiple-input framework is established under a 
CRS assumption. The imposition of a CRS structure for the production technology 
implicitly assumes that producing units operate on optimal scales. As the different ULBs 
operate in different market structures, externalities and the different financial restrictions 
this assumption can be a handicap analyzing real situations.  
 The variable returns to scale (VRS) model is developed by Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (BCC 1984) which is able to decompose the technical inefficiency and scale 
inefficiency by defining and estimating the former at a given scale of operation under the 
assumption of a unique optimum (Maindiratta, 1990).  BCC (1984) is the most general 
model in DEA which is used widely in economics and management literature which  
incorporates a constraint in the CCR 1978 framework to accommodate VRS and thus 
integrates the concept of technical and scale efficiencies together in a standard LP 
model. 
   The next challenge is to incorporate unrealized output potential and/or 
avoidable input waste explicitly in the framework for analyzing efficiency. In case of 
technical efficiency there are two distinct dimensions: firstly, whether the DMU has 
selected the correct technique of production or not, i.e., choosing the correct ray (in two-
dimension input-plane), and secondly, if the correct technique is chosen whether the 
scale has been selected optimally or not (i.e. the exact location on the ray). Since an 
efficient DMU has to achieve both, the exact sequencing of choice does not have much 
bearing on the final outcome.  To select an appropriate scale one seeks the maximum 
equi-proportionate increase in all outputs or decrease in all inputs which is known as 
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radial efficiency. However, the radial projection of an observed input-output bundle onto 
the frontier does not necessarily exhaust the potential for expansion in all outputs or 
reduction in all inputs. In this case one needs some non radial movement along with 
production frontier to reach the efficient point. This movement calls for a change in input 
(output)-proportions. Hence, two types of slacks are encountered (a) input slacks and 
(b) output slacks. Figures 5 and 6 explain the notions of input-oriented and output-
oriented technical efficiencies with corresponding illustrations of radial as well as on-
frontier movements to illustrate the notion of both technique related inefficiency and 
scale related inefficiency6.   
  Suppose we have four ULBs A, B, C and D of which C and D are the efficient 
ULBs. Now with the help of observed input-output data the piecewise linear isoquant 
(SS/) can be constructed (Figure-5)7 ULBs A and B represent two inefficient ULBs. So, 
the extent of their technical inefficiency will be 
OA
OA/
 and
OB
OB /
 respectively. But it is not 
the ultimate efficient point because one could reduce the input 2x  by the amount CA
/  
 
Figure-5 Input Oriented Radial and Slack Efficiency 
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 For output-oriented technical efficiency the interpretation of radial and slack inefficiencies will just be reversed.  
7
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and still produce the same output. Therefore, this movement along the isoquant is 
known as the input slack. On the other hand in case of DMU B only radial movement is 
enough to ensure efficient input-output combination. No slack movement is required 
here. Similarly the concept of output slack can be described.   
Similarly consider Figure-68 where a DMU operates at P, a point inside the 
production possibility frontier. The position is clearly inefficient as through a radial 
movement the DMU may operate at P/ and produce greater amounts of both 21 & yy . 
This distance from P to P/ is called the radial inefficiency. However, it is interesting to 
note that even at point P/ the DMU has scope to increase its output by using the same 
level of inputs. A movement along the frontier from P/ to A will help it to increase the 
amount of 1y  without sacrificing that of 2y , and, hence, the value of total output would 
certainly be higher at A compared to that at P/. This distance from P/ to A is known as 
output slack inefficiency.  
 
Figure-6 Output Oriented Radial and Slack Efficiency 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Here 21 & yy indicate two outputs and x represents one input. 
P 
P
/
 A 
O 
x
y1  
x
y2
30 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
Formulation of Standard DEA Problem 
 In the traditional DEA model, production technology with the following properties 
is hypothesized: 
i) The production possibility set is convex, ie if (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) are both 
feasible input-output bundles then (x/,y/) is also a feasible bundle where         
x/=λ x0+ (1-λ) x1, y/= λ y0 +(1-λ) y1, 0≤ λ≤ 1. 
ii) Inputs and outputs are  freely disposable ie if (x, y) Є T then (x/, y) Є T 
when x/ ≥ x and (x, y/) Є T when y/ ≤ y. 
iii) When a sample of input-output bundles (xi, yi) is observed for N ULBs, 
N=1,……,N, we assume further that (xi, yi) Є T for i=1,2,…..,,N.  
iv) The technology satisfies variable returns to scale. 
 
We select   Tv={(x,y) : x≥ Σλjx
j ;  y≤ Σλjy
j ;  Σλj =1;   λj≥0, j=1(1)n},  the smallest of all 
the sets satisfying assumptions (i) - (iv). This is the inner approximation of the 
underlying technology set. 
Let there be N ULBs each producing m outputs from n inputs. DMU t uses input 
bundle xt =(x1t,….,xnt) to produce output bundle y
t=(y1t,….,ynt). We use vector of virtual 
prices of inputs and outputs itu and jtv  respectively and get the average productivity of 
DMU t as : 
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The production relation has to satisfy the constraint stated as txuyv
n
i
ititjt
m
j
jt 
 11
 along 
with non-negativity restriction on virtual prices. So, the problem is:  
Max:              
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jt xuyv
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; Nt .,,.........2,1  ………………....Model-1 
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                          0, jtit vu . 
This is a fractional programming problem. A price normalization constraint can be 
incorporated by virtue of which it can be written as:  
Max:             jt
m
j
jt yp
1
,  
Subject to:    


n
i
itit
m
j
jtjt xwyp
11
1   Nt .,,.........2,1  
                    


n
i
itit xw
1
1, 0, jtit pw  Nt .,,.........2,1  
This is a standard Linear Programming Problem and here itit uw   and jtjt vp  with 
λ>0.   
Therefore, the dual of Model-2 can be written as: 
Min:             
Subject to: mjyy jt
N
t
jtt ......,,.........2,1;
1

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                  nixx it
N
t
itt ......,,.........2,1;
1


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                  Ntt .......,,.........2,1;0   
Where:        is free. 
 
From Model-3 one can estimate   which is nothing but the input oriented technical 
inefficiency score of tht  DMU under CRS assumption. Again if we define 


1
  and 


 tt   then minimization of   is equivalent with maximization of . In terms of 
redefined variable the LP problem (Model-3) now becomes 
 
Max:            
Subject to: mjyy jt
N
t
jtt ......,,.........2,1;
1


   
…………………Model-2 
 
…………………Model-3 
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                  nixx it
N
t
itt ......,,.........2,1;
1


  
                  Ntt .......,,.........2,1;0   
Where:        is free. 
The score generated from the expression 

1
 is nothing but the output oriented technical 
efficiency of the tht  DMU under CRS. These two models consist of the first generation 
model of efficiency score measurement proposed by CCR.  
The (in)efficiency measurement with additional constraint 1
1


N
t
t  in Model-3 
and 1
1


N
t
t  in Model-4 gives as the  BCC model which considers the VRS assumption 
instead of CRS assumption.   
Both CCR and BCC models calculate only radial (in) efficiency. For radial and 
slack calculation together one has to use the third generation models given below as 
extensions of Model-3 and Model-4.  
Model 5 is the input version of the efficiency with slacks given as: 
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Where:        is free. 
Model 6 below gives the output version of the same as follows: 
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Subject to: mjysy jtj
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Where:        is free. 

ij ss ,  , indicates the output and input slack and   is any pre-assigned positive number, 
however small. Positive sign means output should be increased and negative sign 
means input should be decreased.  
  
Estimating the Productive Efficiency of ULBs in Karnataka: Results 
 We use model 5 for our analysis. The input version of the efficiency models is 
particularly useful here because the main purpose of this analysis is to focus on the 
expenditure management of ULBs.  
Model 5 is executed as a two stage model. First, the input efficiency scores are 
derived and then a stage follows where corresponding to these efficiency scores the 
optimal slacks are estimated for each ULB. The details are given in a note in Appendix 
1.   
Table 9 Summary Statistics of Variables: Input Oriented Efficiency model 
   Median Average SD Max Min CV 
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
 
twaters (litres) 2950000 8460819 21627106 200000000 12370 2.6 
troadlength (KM) 55 113 202 1773 4 1.8 
tstreetlights (nos) 1650 3524 7469 61523 210 2.1 
tswtransported (tons) 10 24 73 900 1 3.0 
parkarea (sq mts) 13646 115930 523453 5632000 2 4.5 
lroadscleaned (KM) 16 65 284 3600 0.3 4.4 
IN
P
U
T
S
 
onm (INR) 13346500 38650055 130438933 1569443000 867000.0 3.4 
laborcost (INR) 7313000 540232266 7401955836 108000000000 197000 13.7 
perempl (No) 44 98 210 1961 7.0 2.1 
establishment (INR) 672000 10967211 101032896 1400000000 20000.0 9.2 
tcapacityvehicles (tons) 15 221 1505 16240 1.0 6.8 
 
 
…………………Model-6 
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 Table 9 above gives the summary statistics of the input and output variables used to 
generate the input efficiency scores for the ULBs in Karnataka. We use the latest data 
available for 2009-10 for all the variables. This is a six output five input model with 
outputs as: 
twaters: Total annual water supplied in a ULB, 
troadlength:Total roadlength in a ULB, 
tstreetlights:Total no. of streetlights in a ULB, 
tswtransported: total daily solid waste transported after collection, 
parkarea: Total area developed and maintained as parks in a ULB, 
lroadscleaned:Total length of roads cleaned daily in the ULB. 
 
The input vector is given by: 
onm: total onm expenditures on basic services, 
laborcost: total cost on wages, salaries and contractual payments on labor 
perempl: Total no. of permanent employees in the ULB, 
establishment: total cost of running the establishment of the ULB, 
tcapacityvehicles:  Total capacityof vehicles for solid waste management of a ULB. 
 
 It is to be noted that inputs chosen cover the running operations and maintenance 
costs, laborcost, human capital stock as number of permanent employees, size or 
capacity of vehicles to perform a service like solid waste management and the 
establishment cost. These are the major inputs which go into the provision of important 
services spelt out in the output vector. 
 Figure 7 below gives the distribution of efficiency scores of ULBs. Efficiency scores 
can vary between 0 and 1. We find that more than 50 per cent of the ULBs have 
efficiency higher than 0.73 and the remaining 50 per cent of the ULBs are distributed in 
the lower range between 0.27 and 0.73. The efficiency scores of all the ULBs are 
tabulated in Table A1 in the Appendix 2. 
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Figure 7:Distribution of Input Oriented Efficiency Scores of Karnataka Cities 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 :Summary : Input Oriented Efficiency Model of Karnataka Cities 
 
  Below 25,000 25,000 to 50,000 Above 50,000 All 
No. Of  ULBs 88 75 50 213 
Inefficient ULBs (Nos) 64 58 31 153 
Inefficient ULBs (%) 72.7 77.3 62 71.8 
Median 0.76 0.67 0.77 0.73 
Average 0.76 0.69 0.77 0.74 
SD 0.2 0.24 0.22 0.22 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Min 0.3 0.27 0.34 0.27 
CV 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.3 
 
 
Table 10 above summarises some useful statistics. We have grouped the 
efficiency scores for each size class to generate these statistics from the optimization 
model results which is applied to all the cities together. We find that there is not much 
difference in the average and the median and the variation across cities and within a 
city size class is also minimal. On an average the ULBs in Karnataka can save upto 27 
per cent of the inputs to achieve the maximum efficiency in the prescribed model (Table 
10). That is to say the cities can provide the same levels of services by utilizing 
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resources lesser by 27 per cent of what they currently use. Though we do not get any 
uniform pattern for the average efficiency scores across size classes, we find that the 
highest efficiency score is recorded for the biggest size class of cities and the lowest 
score in the medium size class. The medium size class also records the highest 
percentage of inefficient ULBs in the group. 
We also attempt an analysis of additional cost saving through slacks in inputs or 
higher levels of outputs through slacks in output after attaining the maximum efficiency. 
These slacks locate the sources and quantum of input savings additional to what has 
been recorded in the radial efficiency scores. Table 11 below summarises the variables 
in which slacks are recorded. For each size class the number and percentage of ULBs 
having slacks in important input and output variables in the model are recorded. We find 
that among the input variables the highest proportion of ULBs record slacks in 
establishment expenditure and the lowest proportion of ULBs record slacks in ONM 
expenditure. This is true for all the size classes of cities also. As far as the output slacks 
are concerned on the whole the highest proportion of ULBs record slacks on the length 
of roads cleaned. 
Table 11 ULBs with Slacks in Input-Used /Output- Produced among Inefficient 
ULBs  
  Below 25,000 25,000 to 50,000 Above 50,000 All 
   No % No % No % No % 
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
 twaters 32 50 25 43 11 35 68 44 
troadlength  43 67 24 41 10 32 77 50 
tstreetlights  28 44 26 45 16 52 70 46 
tswtransported  43 67 22 38 8 26 73 48 
lroadscleaned  33 52 39 67 22 71 94 61 
IN
P
U
T
S
 onm  9 14 10 17 3 10 22 14 
laborcost  31 48 10 17 5 16 46 30 
perempl  15 23 12 21 5 16 32 21 
establishment  33 52 27.5 47.5 15 48 75 49 
tcapacityvehicles 13 20 28 48 20 65 59 39 
 
 From the above analysis it is clear that many of the ULBs can further save 
resources/increase outputs after reducing the inputs to have a radial contraction of 27 
per cent on an average to attain 100 per cent efficiency. We can quantify these slacks 
by taking the values of the slacks in the respective variables as a percentage of the 
values of the variables used in the model.   
 
 Performance Evaluation of Urban Local Governments: A Case for Indian Cities 37 
 
Table 12 Quantum of Slacks in Input-Used /Output- Produced among Inefficient 
ULBs (%) 
  Below 25,000 25,000 to 50,000 Above 50,000 All 
 Average CV Average CV Average CV Average CV 
 
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
 twaters 47 2.5 445 6 51 4 188 8 
total roadlength 47 2 28 3 11 3 32. 3 
streetlights 22 5 14 2 14 2 17 4. 
swtransported 49 2.8 19 2.8 6 3 28 3 
length of roads cleaned 109 5.8 83 2 62 2 89 5 
IN
P
U
T
S
 onm 2 3.7 3 3 2 5 2.3 4 
laborcost 13 1.7 4 3.5 2.2 4 7. 2 
perempl 4. 3 4 2.9 3 4 4 3 
establishment 17 1.5 11 1.6 10 1.7 13 1.6 
tcapacityvehicles 5 3 11 1.6 11 1.5 10 2 
 
Table 12 above presents the summary statistics on the quantum of slacks in inputs 
and outputs in our model.  We find that after a radial contraction of all inputs by 27 per 
cent on an average the ULBs in Karnataka, the quantum of slacks is the highest for 
establishment expenditures (13 per cent) and lowest for ONM expenditures (2.3 per 
cent) and this is true for all size classes of cities. For outputs the quantum of expansion 
potential is the highest for water supply (188 per cent) and the lowest for street-lighting 
(17 per cent) but this does not hold for all the size classes of cities9. In most of the 
resources and services, the quantum of slack is higher in smaller cities indicating to the 
fact that mis-utilisation of resources and under-provision of services are more 
pronounced in the smaller cities. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
  The paper analyses the performance of the ULBs in the state of Karnataka in India 
in the light of the problems encountered in the city level management in South Asia. 
One of the major difficulties in the cities in this region has been the inefficiency in 
service delivery and misallocation of resources of the cities. The paper throws some 
light on different aspects of performance in Indian cities: be it own revenue generation, 
expenditure management and service delivery. The paper also attempts to build up an 
                                                 
9
 It is to be noted that the input slack in percentages cannot exceed 100 as the optimization exercise in production 
involves minimization of inputs and the potential reduction in inputs cannot exceed the amounts of inputs used in 
the model whereas output slacks can exceed 100 as output expansions are determined from the model and the 
potential expansion can exceed the amount of outputs produced 
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integrated framework for analysis of performance in the cities in India bringing in all the 
aspects of performance together. 
It is to be noted that there has been a shortfall in the norms for physical levels of 
services for all the services in all size classes of cities. We find that own revenues can 
finance only 27 per cent of the revenue expenditures and 50 per cent of the ONM 
expenditures on major services. We also find that there is a shortfall of more than 50 
per cent of the ONM expenditure norms prescribed for Indian cities on the major 
services in the cities of Karnataka. We estimate the expenditure requirements on major 
services and the own revenue potentials of the ULBs and find that there can be a 
possible increase of 16 per cent in the own revenues which can cover 27 per cent of 
expenditure requirements on major services. 
After a detailed analysis of the expenditures, revenues and service delivery we 
attempt to fit a DEA model to derive the technical efficiency scores of the ULBs. These 
scores can give an indication of the possible overspending or under-provision of  
services by the ULBs in a benchmarking framework. We find that the ULBs on an 
average can reduce 27 per cent of their expenditures on ONM, labor and establishment 
to provide the same levels of services provided currently by them. We also find that 
there can be additional savings particularly on establishment and labor expenditures to 
operate at the maximum efficiency levels. We find that the extent of problem of 
unproductive spending and under-provision of services is more pronounced in smaller 
cities. 
Two important points need special mention. First, it has been found that the 
performances of the smaller cities are more discouraging than the bigger ones. Though 
in India there has been specific reform agendas targeted for small and medium towns 
there is a tendency of neglecting these cities. It is to be noted that the performance of 
the smaller cities are crucial for that of the bigger cities. This dependence has to be 
respected and smaller cities need more attention. 
Second, the mis-utilisation of resources in establishment and laborcost is very 
common for India cities. It is in the establishment expenditures and contractual 
payments in the laborcost component we find more leakages as the monitoring of these 
expenditures are difficult. Sometimes whether some part of these categories of 
 Performance Evaluation of Urban Local Governments: A Case for Indian Cities 39 
 
expenditures are justified or not becomes a question. It is because of the  administrative 
inefficiency we get inefficient usage of inputs. The misutilisation of labor as permanent 
employees indicate that the ULBs of Karnataka have overstaffing problems, if we take 
into account the levels of services produced as the benchmarks. That is to say to 
provide the current levels of services, the employment base could be narrower. All 
these mis-utilisation issues have to be resolved with proper planning and monitoring 
which is not there in Indian cities. The service level benchmarking as an endeavor of the 
Ministry of Urban Development is most welcome at this point of time as an effort to 
initiate the monitoring of services provision in a systematic framework.   
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Appendix 1 
 
A Note on Input Efficiency Model10 
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Where:        is free. 
******************************* 
However, the presence or absence of weakly efficient DMUs makes the procedure a 
little different.  
A DMU is efficient iff  
~
 =1 and 
is
 ≠ 0; and (or) js
≠ 0  for all i and j; 
A DMU is weakly efficient iff 
~
 =1 and is
 = js
=0  for some i and j; 
We do not know before the calculations whether weakly efficient DMUs are present. In 
the absence of weakly efficient DMUs, we can estimate the optimal slacks using eq 5.3 
in the second stage.  
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Where:        is free. 
*********************************** 
                                                 
10
 Ray SC (2004) Data envelopment analysis theory and techniques for economics and operations 
research.Cambridge University Press (Pp 35-36), Cambridge ; Joe Zhu (2003): Quantitative Models for 
Performance Evaluation and benchmarking: Data Envelopment Analysis with Spreadsheets and DEA 
Excel Solver, Kluwer Academic Publishers (Pp 5-9) 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Table A1: Efficiency Scores of the ULBs in Karnataka 
 
Sl no ULB Input Efficiency Scores 
1 Afzalpur 1 
2 Aland 0.600485282 
3 Alnavara 0.372469076 
4 Alur 0.692001473 
5 Anekal 0.391944057 
6 Ankola 0.34854772 
7 Annigeri 0.396670809 
8 Arakalgud 0.463033612 
9 Arasikere 0.425046846 
10 Athani 0.469462295 
11 Aurad 1 
12 Badami 0.267654689 
13 Bagalkote 0.610659762 
14 Bagepalli 1 
15 Bailahongal 1 
16 Bangarpet 0.67974928 
17 Bankapura 1 
18 Bannur 0.663859143 
19 Bantwal 1 
20 Basavakalyana 0.584984124 
21 Basavanabagewadi 0.515723808 
22 Beelagi 0.875304534 
23 Belgaum 1 
24 Bellary 1 
25 Belthangadi 1 
26 Belur 0.821359487 
27 Bhadravathi 1 
28 Bhalki 0.393483913 
29 Bhatkal 1 
30 Bidar 1 
31 Bijapur 0.877046519 
32 Birur 0.617137823 
33 Byadgi 1 
34 Challakere 0.387033212 
35 Chamarajanagar 0.592901 
36 Channagiri 0.617379176 
37 Channapatna 0.531787969 
38 Channarayapatna 0.661097558 
39 Chikkaballapur 1 
40 Chikkanayakanahalli 0.666857991 
41 Chikkodi 0.913105557 
42 Chikmagalur 0.471594631 
43 Chincholi 1 
44 Chintamani 0.339075552 
45 Chitradurga 0.512030525 
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46 Chittaguppa 1 
47 Chittapur 0.466822296 
48 Dandeli 0.581750689 
49 Davangere 1 
50 Devadurga 1 
51 Devanahalli 0.753726144 
52 Doddaballapur 0.603940119 
53 Gadag Betegeri 0.888378722 
54 Gajendragad 0.851757122 
55 Gangavathi 0.693351082 
56 Gokak 0.791622627 
57 Gowribidanur 0.461725794 
58 Gubbi 0.725705106 
59 Gudibande 1 
60 Gulbarga 1 
61 Guledgudda 0.327032065 
62 Gundlupet 0.418173539 
63 Gurumitkal 1 
64 Haliyal 0.973973086 
65 Hanagal 0.662912254 
66 Hanur 0.850671528 
67 Harappanahalli 0.684869388 
68 Harihara 0.719963047 
69 Hassan 0.707509606 
70 Haveri 1 
71 Heggadadevanakote 0.809991218 
72 Hirekerur 0.829358105 
73 Hiriyur 0.470877128 
74 Holalkere 0.507967606 
75 Holenarsipura 0.300608662 
76 Honnali 0.892688886 
77 Honnavar 0.576278878 
78 Hoovinahadagali 1 
79 Hosadurga 0.727447908 
80 Hosakote 0.294540384 
81 Hosanagara 0.723127062 
82 Hospet 1 
83 Hubli Dharwad 1 
84 Hukkeri 1 
85 Humnabad 0.817517188 
86 Hunagund 0.87148942 
87 Hunsur 0.817596961 
88 Ilkal 0.450680815 
89 Indi 0.744151872 
90 Jagalur 0.561785776 
91 Jamakhandi 0.441093502 
92 Jewargi 0.338496002 
93 Jog  Kargal 1 
94 K.R.Nagar 0.567094543 
95 K.R.Pet 1 
96 Kadur 0.824872796 
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97 Kalagatgi 0.465246435 
98 Kamalapur 1 
99 Kampli 0.580769045 
100 Kanakapura 0.578597458 
101 Karkala 1 
102 Karwar 0.8735714 
103 Kerur 0.653439475 
104 Khanapur 0.650212304 
105 Kolar 0.942043148 
106 Kollegal 0.747127458 
107 Konnur 0.643856116 
108 Koppa 0.736632418 
109 Koppal 0.540031382 
110 Koratagere 1 
111 Kottur 0.820212088 
112 Kudachi 0.678726023 
113 Kudligi 0.42530363 
114 Kumta 0.53999589 
115 Kundagol 0.298041466 
116 Kundapur 0.620280104 
117 Kunigal 0.667145045 
118 Kushalanagara 0.72343212 
119 Kushtagi 0.929059586 
120 Lakshmishwara 0.382373584 
121 Lingasugur 1 
122 Maddur 0.798192975 
123 Madhugiri 1 
124 Madikeri 0.538407015 
125 Magadi 1 
126 Mahalingapur 1 
127 Malavalli 0.551566293 
128 Malur 1 
129 Mandya 1 
130 Mangalore 1 
131 Manvi 1 
132 Molakalmur 1 
133 Moodabidri 0.616161695 
134 Mudagal 0.768371325 
135 Mudalagi 0.728651278 
136 Muddebihal 0.690034253 
137 Mudhol 0.738386468 
138 Mudigere 0.493871345 
139 Mulbagal 0.451427224 
140 Mulgund 0.782288787 
141 Mulki 0.572023715 
142 Mundagod 0.508034006 
143 Mundargi 0.708025651 
144 Mysore 1 
145 Nagamangala 0.564371793 
146 Nanjanagud 0.488642792 
147 Naragund 0.46562626 
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148 Narasimharajapura 0.656931406 
149 Naregal 1 
150 Navalgund 0.37781851 
151 Nelamangala 0.935512348 
152 Nippani 1 
153 Pandavapura 0.563832453 
154 Pavagada 0.974227661 
155 Periyapatna 0.758718667 
156 Puttur 1 
157 Rabkavi Banhatti 0.647527044 
158 Raichur 0.888157094 
159 Ramadurg 0.853467281 
160 Ramanagaram 0.55287467 
161 Ranebennur 0.573565772 
162 Rayabagh 1 
163 Robertsonpet 1 
164 Ron 0.348973828 
165 Sadalaga 0.769409712 
166 Sagar 0.518933808 
167 Sakleshpura 0.680600629 
168 Saligrama 1 
169 Sandur 1 
170 Sankeshwar 1 
171 Saragur 0.51260523 
172 Saundatti 0.801861788 
173 Savanur 0.439343397 
174 Sedam 0.897733821 
175 Shahabad(CMC) 1 
176 Shahapur 0.463381403 
177 Shidlaghatta 1 
178 Shiggaon 1 
179 Shikaripura 0.673051396 
180 Shimoga 1 
181 Shiraguppa 0.8330567 
182 Shirahatti 1 
183 Shiralakoppa 0.655718452 
184 Shringeri 0.672077641 
185 Shrirangapatna 0.927500185 
186 Siddapur 0.707773715 
187 Sindagi 0.675323588 
188 Sindhanoor 0.718244339 
189 Sira 1 
190 Sirsi 0.558658163 
191 Somwarpet 0.49591436 
192 Soraba 1 
193 Srinivasapur 0.416883088 
194 Sullya 0.880430742 
195 Surpur 1 
196 T.Narsipur 0.914094635 
197 Talikote 0.598099575 
198 Tarikere 0.367690064 
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199 Tekkalakote 0.746076709 
200 Teradal 0.789954094 
201 Thirthahalli 0.768935418 
202 Tiptur 0.347141991 
203 Tumkur 0.692431944 
204 Turuvekere 0.722542801 
205 Udupi 1 
206 Ullal 1 
207 Vijayapura 0.970651338 
208 Virajpet 0.842466396 
209 Wadi 0.553134217 
210 Yadgir 0.71026863 
211 Yelandur 1 
212 Yelburga 0.74838059 
213 Yellapur 0.581849336 
 
 
